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Certain conceptual issues persist stubbornly in philosophy, changing form and focus over time. 
Analysis of historical and philosophical development of concepts can help us to understand the 
contemporary conceptual issues we face. In this thesis, I examine conceptual change in the case 
of a historically slippery concept in the philosophy of biology – the species concept. Broadly put, 
a species concept answers the question, “What is it to be a species?” The work of Charles 
Darwin in the nineteenth century had interesting consequences for the species concept in terms 
of conceptual development. Here is an interesting claim: Darwin is a species realist. It is a 
contentious one, debated throughout the historical and philosophical literature on Darwin. I wish 
to raise and resolve a new concern: Darwin is a species realist, even though he denies certain 
properties which, on the views of his peers, make species real. This apparent contradiction gives 
rise to two questions: first, how can Darwin resolve this issue and be a species realist? Second, 
why is he motivated to take such a stance? Then, with answers to these two questions in mind, I 
ask, what is the structure of this conceptual shift? I give historically motivated answers to the 
first two questions, and then sketch a philosophical framework which incorporates the first two 
questions and answers the third. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Certain conceptual issues persist stubbornly in philosophy, changing form and focus over time. 
Analysis of historical and philosophical development of concepts can help us to understand the 
contemporary conceptual issues we face.1 In this thesis, I examine conceptual change in the case 
of a historically slippery concept in the philosophy of biology – the species concept. Broadly put, 
a species concept answers the question, “What is it to be a species?” In contemporary philosophy 
of biology, the issues surrounding the species concept are collectively referred to as ‘the species 
problem’ – some reviewers claim there are around 70 proposed species concepts (Mayden, 
1997), and none is universally applicable nor unanimously satisfying.2 In spite of the fact that the 
species concept has eluded consensus on its characterization throughout history, biologists have 
made a great deal of progress in the fields of evolution, genetics, and speciation – fields where 
one might expect a seemingly fundamental notion as that of ‘species’ to be well-understood. An 
analysis of the changes in the species concept over time may help to elucidate how the concept is 
operating in contemporary biology and philosophy, and further, why we continue to have a 
species problem. 
                                                 
1 See Lennox (2001). 
2 For some more literature on the abundance of and conflict among species concepts which initially helped to 
motivate this project, see Wiley and Mayden (2000), Velasco (2008), Valen (1976), Mayr (1942), and Claridge, 
Dawah, and Wilson (1997).  
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 In order to better understand the development of the species concept, I will consider one 
of the particularly interesting issues that arises in connection with it: that of species realism. Here 
is what turns out to be a puzzling claim: Darwin was a species realist. He believed that our 
species designations picked out groups that are produced by nature – even if, as we will see, 
those groups are not distinct. The question of species realism, within the larger question of the 
nature of the species concept, is still somewhat controversial, though the debate now seems to 
lean toward a consensus on realism.3 But as I will show, species realism was a complicated 
stance for Darwin to take.  
 I will raise and answer two major questions about the significant development of the 
species concept which came about as a result of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural 
selection, in particular with his publication of The Origin. I will argue that Darwin is indeed a 
species realist, though his realist stance about species is puzzling for this major reason:  when his 
contemporaries are species realists, they believe species are also immutable and categorically 
distinct from varieties. And when they are not species realists, they are so because they deny the 
existence of those properties. Darwin rejects the very things which his peers think make species 
real. I ask: how could Darwin be a species realist in the face of this apparent contradiction? And, 
if I can establish how Darwin can make his theory do this, I then ask: why? Why go to great and 
meticulous lengths to continue being a species realist when he might very well have chosen not 
to be? 
 In the first chapter, I consider the “how” question. How could Darwin be a species realist, 
when his claims about species run counter to the very properties which, on the views of his 
peers, make species real? I will show that in order to maintain what would otherwise seem to be 
                                                 
3 See Wiley and Lieberman (2011) for discussion on the state of species realism in contemporary biology. 
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an incoherent position, Darwin makes significant revisions in what it is for a species to be real. 
In the second chapter, I ask: why does Darwin choose to be a realist about species in nature, 
when he might reasonably have chosen the opposite stance? From an angle of historical analysis, 
I show that species realism is closely related to the particular kind of origin account given for 
species. In particular, Darwin’s origin account for new species is organic evolution; he proposes 
that species are causal players in the production of new species. I contrast this with the origin 
account of special creation – which accounts not only for the production of new species, but for 
the origin of organic life itself. While Darwin provides an origin account for new species distinct 
from special creation, he finds a new motivation for realism: because species groups help to 
causally determine the course of evolution, they are not artificial groupings imposed by 
conventions of systematics. 
In the third chapter, I develop a philosophical framework which helps to visualize and 
explain the changes to SPECIES and SPECIES REALISM discussed in the previous two chapters.4 A 
crucial feature of this conceptual shift is that Darwin seeks to maintain the referent of SPECIES – 
he is talking about the same thing in nature that, say, Charles Lyell is talking about. But he 
makes significant and fundamental revisions to the content of the concept. I detail the revisions 
that Darwin makes in terms of reconfiguring the non-referential semantic structure of the 
complex concept SPECIES. I conclude by summarizing the overall conceptual shift in SPECIES and 
SPECIES REALISM. 
                                                 
4 Small caps are used to mention concepts. Single quotes will be used to mention terms. 
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2.0  HOW COULD DARWIN BE A SPECIES REALIST? 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Certain natural philosophers, including Carl Linnaeus, Comte de Buffon, and Charles Lyell, were 
instrumental in establishing the species concepts prevalent in the 18th and 19th centuries. Though 
their individual conceptions of species differ in several respects, each relies on an association 
between the commitment to species realism and the belief that species are both immutable and 
categorically distinct from varieties. These are claims about the properties of species (this will be 
important in the next chapter, where I will discuss claims about the origin(s) of species as 
opposed to properties). In addition, because they believe species are distinct and immutable, their 
method for testing a species – determining whether some group of organisms is or is not a 
species – is to form a constituent definition based on those properties.5 
 The three aforementioned naturalists embrace species realism, but others, in response to 
new evidence, instead reject the realist stance. J.B. Lamarck believes he has evidence of 
transformation – evidence against immutability and category distinctness – and because he 
agrees with Linnaeus, Buffon, and Lyell in their understanding of what it is for a species to be 
                                                 
5 A constituent definition for a species treats the species as a class, defined by the property or properties shared by 
all and only the members of the species. The role of these definitions with regards to species is further discussed in 
2.2.1 in the case of Buffon’s species concept. 
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real, he rejects species realism. For all of these natural philosophers, immutability of species and 
category distinctness between species and varieties are bound up with species realism. 
 Given this association between species realism on the one hand, and immutability and 
distinctness on the other, Charles Darwin appears to be doing something strange in his Origin of 
Species. He rejects immutability and category distinctness, a necessary consequence of 
proposing gradual evolutionary change. But unlike Lamarck, who also proposes a theory of 
gradual evolutionary change, Darwin remains a species realist. This would appear contradictory: 
Darwin’s contemporaries and predecessors did not allow for holding a realist view about species 
without believing in immutability and category distinctness. Darwin is a species realist, but 
rejects those things which, on their view, make species real. How could Darwin be a species 
realist? 
 I will argue that when Darwin develops his theory of evolution by natural selection in 
The Origin, he not only makes new empirically supported claims of gradualism and evolution, 
but also effects a change in what it is for species to be real: there are really two conceptual shifts 
going on – in SPECIES and SPECIES REALISM. Darwin’s change can be described as having two 
steps. In his first step, he makes his new claims about nature: he rejects the properties of 
immutability and distinctness and instead claims that species are mutable and evolve gradually. 
This is the beginning of a conceptual shift in SPECIES. And this step has consequences for a belief 
in species realism: those features which constitute natural boundaries do not exist. Therefore, his 
second step is to resolve this apparent contradiction by instead tying his belief in species realism 
to his belief in community of descent. This is the completion of the conceptual shift in SPECIES.6 
Consequently, instead of testing the reality of a species by looking for constituent definitions, 
                                                 
6 It is also the entirety of a conceptual shift in species realism – see 4.2.2. 
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Darwin believes we should look for characters which reveal common ancestry and conclude we 
have identified a real species when we have found shared characters that allow us to construct a 
branching pattern of descent. 
 I will first give a historical account of the relationships among realism, immutability, 
distinctness, and constituent definitions evident in the work of 18th and 19th century naturalists. I 
will then give an account of Darwin’s view. I will specify the changes he makes in what it is to 
be a species and in what it is for a species to be real, and I will then describe the consequent 
change Darwin effects in how we determine if a species that we believe we have identified is 
indeed a real one. 
 Here I must make two notes about terminology. First, the meaning of ‘real’ is consistent 
among the naturalists I will discuss, including Darwin. To be real is to be a feature of nature, 
rather than of artifice or construction contingent upon human interest. Darwin’s impact was not 
to change the ontological doctrine of realism, nor the meaning of ‘real.’ Rather, he changed what 
it is for a species to be real in nature.7 Second, in the case of Linnaeus, the question is framed in 
terms of naturalness, rather than reality. Others will use explicitly ontological terms, like ‘real’ 
and ‘exist.’ In each case, I will show that the naturalist under consideration is referring to species 
realism. 
                                                 
7 Again – see 4.2.2 
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2.2 REALISM, IMMUTABLITY, AND CATEGORY DISTINCTNESS 
Several historical examples of prominent naturalists show that the belief in species realism was 
often concurrent with commitments both to a categorical distinction between the species group 
and the varieties within a species, and to immutability. A commitment to a categorical difference 
between species and varieties is a commitment to the belief that, for example, the differences that 
mark different breeds of dogs are categorically distinct from the differences which distinguish 
dog from wolf. Those latter two commitments can be distinguished but are themselves 
necessarily tied together for species. Categorical distinctness means that species have natural 
boundaries, and immutability implies the maintenance of these boundaries over time.8 
2.2.1 Buffon Becomes a Species Realist When Definitions Become Possible 
The first case, that of Buffon, illustrates an explicit conversion to species realism when evidence 
shows constituent definitions to be achievable. Buffon revises his species concept, maintaining 
the relationship between beliefs in natural boundaries for species and species realism. In his 1749 
Histoire Naturelle, he claims that species are artificial, because when studying organisms in finer 
and finer detail, a systematist eventually arrives at the consideration of individuals – Buffon 
                                                 
8 The historical examples are not given chronologically; rather, they are organized to best show the common 
association of beliefs among the naturalists discussed. The first three examples show a commitment to realism and 
both immutability and category distinctness, and the last shows the simultaneous rejection of all of these 
commitments. 
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thinks that individual organisms alone “exist in nature” (Buffon, 1749). Because identifying 
species supposedly picks out natural groups based on differences, but important differences can 
be found down to the level of the individual, the search for constituent definitions of species is a 
flawed enterprise. Buffon writes, 
[Thus] nature, proceeding by unknown gradations, cannot wholly lend herself to these 
divisions [into genera and species]… There will be found a great number of intermediate 
species, and of objects belonging half in one class and half in another” (Buffon, 1749). 
 
In other words, looking for discrete classes of organisms to call species is misguided, as the 
boundaries for classes do not exist. Consequently, species are not real. However, Lovejoy points 
out that Buffon reversed his position when presented with evidence of hybrid infertility. The 
evidence for reproductive boundaries prompted Buffon to commit to a category for species 
distinct from the small gradations between varieties, and also from species anti-realism to species 
realism: in Lovejoy’s terms, reproductive boundaries proved to Buffon that species were 
“objective and fundamental realities” (Lovejoy, 1936, p. 230). The boundaries provide discrete 
classes and thus the grounds on which to constitutively define species. Buffon is only a species 
realist when he is convinced that the criteria of immutability and category distinctness can be 
met.9 
2.2.2 Linnaean Classification and Naturalness 
Carl Linnaeus, in his botanical writings in the 18th century, is committed to species and genera 
being natural groups (here, ‘natural’ has the same sense as Buffon’s ‘real’) and also to ‘species’ 
                                                 
9 For discussion of constituent definitions for species, I have benefitted from Sober (1980), though here I make only 
the claim that naturalists sought constituent definitions, and remain neutral about the larger claim Sober presents 
about a narrative of essentialism for species. 
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as a different kind of designation than ‘variety.’ His views on mutability and the existence of 
hybrid species change throughout his life, but the idea of mutability remains bound up with the 
commitment to naturalness even as he questions, and later accepts, that hybrid species exist. In 
his early writings, he is less concerned about articulating what a species is and more concerned 
with discovering natural species. He believes we approach the ideal of a natural system of 
classification when we study organisms carefully enough. His species concept is therefore 
somewhat implicit, and he does not make claims about realism per se. His assertions of the 
naturalness of species and genera as groups, and not of varieties in the same sense, however, are 
evidence for his commitment to species realism. He holds the ideal of a natural system – though 
he understands his own system to be artificial, he takes this artificiality to be the shortcoming of 
our limited knowledge, not a consequence of an unstructured natural world: 
And it is not possible to hope that our age will be able to see any natural system, nor 
perhaps will posterity. Nevertheless, we are striving to know the plants; so meanwhile 
artificial and substitute classes have to be assumed (Linnaeus’s Genera plantarum, 
1737, translated by Müller-Wille and Reeds (2007, p. 567), emphasis mine.) 
 
A Linnaean natural system should arrange as best it can what nature shows to us: 
All that truly can be known by us depends on a clear method by which we distinguish the 
similar from the dissimilar. The more natural the distinctions this method comprises, the 
more clearly the idea of things emerges to us. The more objects our understanding 
engages with, the more difficult it becomes to work out a method – and the more 
necessary. Nowhere has the Great Creator placed so many objects before the human 
senses as in the vegetable kingdom, which covers the whole globe that we inhabit 
(Linnaeus’s Genera plantarum, 1737, translated by Müller-Wille and Reeds (2007, p. 
564)). 
 
Linnaeus, as a botanist, is focused on classifying plants. But this passage demonstrates that his 
project is one of discovery of the existing, created groups. The distinctions between groups are 
there by virtue of God’s will, and the more closely we approach an account of those distinctions, 
the more natural our system is. 
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 Having established that Linnaeus held a commitment to species realism (though given in 
terms of naturalness), I will now show that he also believed that species and varieties were 
categorically distinct. Linnaeus writes in Philosophia Botanica that “We reckon the number of 
species as the number of different forms that were created in the beginning” while “The number 
of varieties is the number of differing plants that are produced from the seed of the same species” 
(Linnaeus, 1751, pp. 113-114). Expounding on the idea of a variety, he writes, 
A variety is a plant that is changed by an accidental cause: climate, soil, heat, winds, etc., 
and likewise it is restored by a change of soil. Kinds of varieties are size, fullness, 
curling, colour, savour, and smell. Varieties could be excluded from botany, but 
Housekeepers value large and curly ones. Gardeners value full and coloured ones. 
Physicians value savoury and smelly ones (Linnaeus, 1751, p. 114). 
 
Thus, he shows that varieties are not the true groupings given to us by nature, rather they are 
differences within the species group. Additionally, he claims that varieties could be excluded 
from botany if not for interest from parties outside the field (Linnaeus, 1751, p. 114) – they are 
not important to classification in the fundamental way that species are. 
The distinction is made clearer by his discussion of the different kinds of arrangements of 
organisms (specifically, plants) that can be formed. Arrangement of organisms is “the divisions 
and connections of the vegetables” and constitutes “the foundation of nomenclature,” and it can 
be practical, establishing species and varieties, or theoretical, establishing higher taxa. 
Additionally, “practical arrangement can be managed by one who has no understanding of 
system” (Linnaeus, 1751, p. 111). While genera are also natural, they require some systematic 
methodology to establish. Thus, even between species and genera, which are both “made in the 
first place such as it is,” there is something more foundational or obvious about species 
(Linnaeus, 1751, p. 111). 
What about his views on immutability? Linnaeus’ transition from complete denial of 
 11 
hybrid species (as quoted above) to acceptance of several new hybrid species of plant is 
relatively well-known. However, it poses a challenge for his ideal of naturalness. Even as he 
begins to acknowledge the existence of hybrid species in his later writings, he is hesitant to say 
whether or not these hybrid species were intended at the beginning by a creator (Ramsbottom, 
1938). For Linnaeus, the grounding for the reality or naturalness of species is creation and 
admitting to the existence of hybrid species threatens that reality. His hesitance to say that the 
hybrid species were not intended reflects the association between realism and natural boundaries 
– and the concession that the creator may have intended these species is a way to preserve their 
reality by the same standards he had previously used. Linnaeus thus operates under the 
association between realism and natural boundaries, and the evidence for naturalness is our 
discovery of the boundaries between species. 
2.2.3 Lyell’s Empirically Discoverable Species Definitions 
Charles Lyell, principally responding to J.B. Lamarck’s theory of transformation,10 criticizes the 
idea that species could transform into other species over time. His critique illustrates the 
connection between realism and natural boundaries for species – Lyell maintains his 
commitment to realism because of his commitments to immutability and category distinctness, 
which he believes are evidenced by our ability to empirically discover the limits of variation. He 
argues for species as real groups with discoverable natural limits. In his Principles of Geology, 
Lyell responds to Lamarck directly, arguing that Lamarck does not have sufficient evidence to 
support his theory of transformation. In particular, Lamarck lacks evidence for the formation of 
                                                 
10 Lamarck’s theory is discussed in the next section, because his adherence to the same association of beliefs as 
these other naturalists makes clear the tension that will arise when Darwin’s theory comes into play.  
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new organs. Lyell gives an empirical explanation for the apparent gradation between species by 
appealing to domestication, which essentially tests the limits of variation within a species. He 
claims that the capacity for domestication already exists inherent to the species, and this is why 
some animals are fit for domestication and some are not (Lyell, 1832, p. 47). Additionally, to 
refute Lamarck’s mechanism of evolutionary change, Lyell cites that in many cases, learned 
faculties (for example, a pig trained for hunting) are not passed on to offspring (Lyell, 1832, p. 
42). From domestication and observation in nature, Lyell infers that: 
[T]he entire variation from the original type, which any given kind of change can 
produce, may usually be effected in a brief period of time, after which no further 
deviation can be obtained by continuing to alter the circumstances, though ever so 
gradually, indefinite divergence, either in the way of improvement or deterioration, being 
prevented, and the least possible excess beyond the defined limits being fatal to the 
existence of the individual (Lyell, 1832, p. 65). 
 
This constitutes an empirical objection to mutability. His explanation also includes an element of 
reproductive isolation, which enforces immutability. He writes that, “[t]he intermixture of 
distinct species is guarded against by the aversion of the individuals composing them to sexual 
union, or by the sterility of the mule offspring,” and he ultimately concludes that “[f]rom the 
above considerations, it appears that species have a real existence in nature, and that each was 
endowed, at the time of its creation, with the attributes and organization by which it is now 
distinguished” (Lyell, 1832, p. 65). Lyell’s commitment to fixed ranges of variation explains 
differences observed among organisms without appealing to mutability, and this defense also 
reinforces the distinction between a species and a variety. Reproductive boundaries and 
observable limits to domestication show that species have naturally existing boundaries between 
them, while ‘varieties’ only describes the differences observed within the fixed boundary of the 
species. We can, then, define species constituently, because each of them will possess a defining 
feature about which the individuals vary. He is responding to Lamarck, who, as we will see in 
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the next section, denied the reality of species because he rejected the basis for such definitions as 
Lyell describes. 
2.2.4 J.B. Lamarck, Species Anti-Realist 
J.B. Lamarck is perhaps the most interesting case of the tie between species realism and natural 
boundaries, because he maintains the connection between realism and natural boundaries and 
throws the two commitments out together. Lamarck published his Zoological Philosophy in 
1809, in which he proposes a theory of transformation and denies the reality of species. He 
rejects species realism because he believes he has evidence challenging the distinction between 
species and varieties, and because his theory contradicts immutability. Lamarck understands the 
definition of species as follows: “Any collection of like individuals which were produced by 
others similar to themselves is called a species.” However, he notes that this definition usually 
implies an understanding of constancy when he writes, “to this definition is added the allegation 
that the individuals composing a species never vary in their specific characters, and consequently 
that species have an absolute constancy in nature” (Lamarck, 1809, p. 35). He challenges the 
contemporary view on species through these three questions: 
(1) Are species of “absolute constancy”? 
(2) Are species “as old as nature”? 
(3) Have species “all existed from the beginning just as we see them to-day”? (Lamarck, 
1809) 
 
‘Constancy’ here includes both immutability and the distinction between species and varieties 
groups. The groups exist with boundaries, and do not change appreciably over time. Lamarck 
answers these questions negatively – the basis for his doubt is that as we progress in studying 
natural history, we are faced with increasing difficulty of determining what is a species 
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(Lamarck, 1809, p. 40). This suggests to Lamarck that rather than hard distinctions between 
species, a gradation exists: 
The species of these genera, arranged in series according to their natural affinities, exhibit 
such slight differences from those next to them as to coalesce with them. These species 
merge more or less into one another, so that there is no means of stating the small 
differences that distinguish them (Lamarck, 1809, p. 37). 
 
His proposition of gradualism is incompatible with the idea of constancy that he outlines in his 
definition of species and his questions (1)-(3). How can species have existed for all time as the 
apparent groups that we see today, if we find it increasingly evident that those delineations are 
not truly there? His doubt is furthered by his acceptance of the existence of hybrid plants 
(Lamarck, 1809, p. 39). His commitment to gradualism affects his commitment to constancy 
because it challenges the idea of a strict distinction between species and varieties designation. 
Indeed, Lamarck thinks the difference between the two categories is arbitrary: 
Hence, naturalists come to arbitrary decisions about individuals observed in various 
countries and diverse conditions, sometimes calling them varieties and sometimes 
species. The work connected with the determination of species therefore becomes daily 
more defective, that is to say, more complicated and confused (Lamarck, 1809, pp. 35-
36). 
 
This breakdown of the difference in designation contributes to his rejection of species realism – 
arbitrary distinctions do not pick out real things in nature. Based on these considerations, 
Lamarck questions “whether the idea of species has any real foundation” (Lamarck, 1809, p. 40). 
 As he develops his theory of transformation, he takes a stance necessarily opposed to 
immutability. His response to the species realism question is to deny that species are real groups 
in nature; rather, they are apparent groups which endure only insofar as their environment 
remains constant. Importantly, he rejects species realism because he believes he has evidence for 
mutability and because he believes that that which we call species are really no different from 
varieties. Like Linnaeus, Lamarck thinks that mutability threatens the reality of species. Unlike 
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Linnaeus, however, he does not hesitate to accept this consequence of hybridization and 
concedes that species are not real groups in nature. Sterility between very different organisms is 
really only evidence for gradualism: 
It is true that often nothing results from these strange copulations, especially when the 
animals are very disparate; and when anything does happen the resulting individuals are 
usually infertile; but we also know that when there is less disparity these defects do not 
occur. Now this cause is by itself sufficient gradually to create varieties, which then 
become races, and in the course of time constitute what we call species (Lamarck, 1809, 
p. 39). 
 
Here, it is important that Lamarck writes “what we call species,” rather than simply “species.” 
He implies that what species appear to be is actually illusory – they are snapshots in overall 
gradualistic change. 
 Lamarck’s rejection of species realism as a consequence of the association between 
beliefs in realism and natural boundaries is even more evident when we consider his views prior 
to 1800 – before he was a transformationist, he was committed to the constancy of species in 
nature. He reflects that he “thought for a long time that there were constant species in nature” in 
his 1802 Recherches sur l’organisation des corps vivants. Richard Burkhardt remarks in his 
book The Spirit of System: Lamarck and Evolutionary Biology that throughout his writings prior 
to 1800, Lamarck never challenges the immutability of species, actually insisting upon their 
reality in nature (Burkhardt, 1977, pp. 87-88). When Lamarck becomes convinced of mutability 
and the gradation between all living things, he transitions from insisting upon the reality of 
species to questioning whether the idea of species has “any real foundation” at all. Discarding 
species realism in response to this theory change is evidence of the strong association among the 
three ideas. 
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2.3 DARWIN’S SPECIES REALISM 
In this section, I characterize Darwin’s view. I will show that Darwin rejects immutability and 
distinctness between species and varieties, but that in spite of this, remains a species realist. This 
observation – that he makes claims of gradualism and evolutionary change like Lamarck does, 
but is not led to the same conclusion about the reality of species – is the key indicator that some 
deeper revision of what it is for a species to be real is going on.  
2.3.1 Darwin is a Species Realist 
In The Origin, Darwin writes that the term ‘species’ is “one arbitrarily given for the sake of 
convenience to a set of individuals closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentially 
differ from the term variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating forms” (Darwin, 
1859, p. 52). The difference between a species and variety is then a matter of degree, or amount 
of difference, rather than a categorical difference in each kind of designation. Darwin makes this 
claim when he writes, “Undoubtedly there is one most important point of difference between 
varieties and species; namely, that the amount of difference between varieties, when compared 
with each other or with their parent-species, is much less than that between the species of the 
same genus” (Darwin, 1859, p. 57). Here, we can see Darwin dispense with the commitments to 
the existence of boundaries between species and to a separate category called ‘variety.’  
Practically, we can decide on which term to apply by examining the degree of difference among 
organisms, and in particular the degree of constancy (as opposed to variability) of shared traits 
(Darwin, 1859, p. 423). This is the first step of the Darwinian shift in what it is for a species to 
be real. Rather than naturally delineated groups within which some variations occur, Darwinian 
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species are groups recognizable by relative similarity within themselves and degree of difference 
from other groups. 
However, in contrast to Lamarck, and though he also uses the term ‘arbitrary’ with 
regards to distinguishing species from varieties, Darwin is not led to anti-realism about species. 
Evidence for Darwin’s species realism suggests he does not mean ‘arbitrary’ in the same sense as 
Lamarck – I will argue that Darwin is not suggesting that there is nothing to species groups, as 
Lamarck was. 
To demonstrate that Darwin does remain committed to species realism despite rejecting 
those features of nature and despite acknowledgment that species names are not firmly attached 
to a strictly defined group, I will briefly draw on Beatty (1985) and Ghiselin (1969). Beatty 
shows that Darwin rejects the species definition of his fellow naturalists because their definition 
included immutability; instead, Darwin forms his species concept based on the properties of the 
referent of the definition espoused by the others – the things in nature that appear to be grouped 
into species. This poses a problem for species realism. Beatty notes that Darwin often seems to 
deny the reality of species when he makes claims like those quoted from The Origin above.11 
Beatty and Ghiselin respond to this problem by pointing out that Darwin affirms the reality of the 
species taxon, rather than the species category: 
There is no statement in the entirety of Darwin’s published writings, which, properly 
interpreted, asserts that there is nothing more than a name between the individuals of a 
species. For, in technical terms, Darwin was denying the reality, not of taxa, but of 
categories (Ghiselin, 1969, p. 93). 
 
Ghiselin is claiming that Darwin did not deny that taxa are formed based on something real, but 
that species themselves do not form categories, and that the species category is not some 
                                                 
11 Though I argue for Darwin’s species realism using evidence from The Origin, Beatty draws more from his longer 
text Natural Selection, an examination of which (the Stauffer (1975) edition) proves convincing of Darwin’s realist 
stance. 
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grouping determined in some fundamentally different way than other groupings of organisms 
(i.e., not categorically distinct from, say, varieties). Darwin believes there are real collections of 
organisms, which are the things that taxonomists call ‘species,’ but the boundaries of those 
taxonomic groups do not exist in nature – so the species category cannot be real as defined in the 
sense understood by his fellow naturalists. Thus, Darwin affirms the reality of the apparent 
groups in nature, rather than those delineated by the species definitions of his contemporaries, 
while Lamarck, for example, denies that the properties of organisms naturally group them at all. 
The fact that Darwin does not “assert that there is nothing more than a name between the 
individuals of a species” (Ghiselin, 1969, p. 93) suggests that Darwin did conceive of species 
realism as having the same definition as his fellow naturalists, that is, that species designations 
pick out something real in nature.12  
2.3.2 The Apparent Contradiction 
However, even if we note that Darwin modifies what it is to be a species and accept Beatty and 
Ghiselin’s explanation that Darwin affirms the reality of the species taxon and not the species 
category, we are still left with a question about realism. They showed that Darwin does think 
species satisfy the requirements for something to be real, i.e., Darwin is a species realist, in some 
sense. But this raises a problem. Darwin appears to be both (a) claiming that species are real, and 
(b) denying that species are immutable and categorically distinct from varieties. As we have just 
seen, however, immutability was part of what it meant for species to be real at this time. There 
are therefore two possibilities: either Darwin’s position is incoherent, or Darwin changes the 
                                                 
12 David N. Stamos (2007) also asserts that Darwin is a species realist, but via a different argument. A close 
comparison of my argument with Stamos’ would be illuminating, though I cannot do it here. 
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requirements for species realism. If the referents of the term ‘species’ are indeed real groups, but 
they are not the naturally-bounded groups defended by Darwin’s contemporaries, they must be 
real in a different sense. What is it, then, on Darwin’s view, for a species to be real? I.e., what is 
required of a species for us to consider it real? 
2.3.3 The Solution: Darwin Revises the Requirements for Species Realism 
Darwin’s new requirement for species to be real is that they are produced by the historical 
process of descent – he ties his commitment to realism to the theory of community of descent. 
Evidence for this (and further evidence that Darwin was indeed a species realist) is found in 
Darwin’s discussion on classification in The Origin, where he lays out his theory’s implications 
for taxonomy. He claims that an accurate classification has an underlying basis in nature – 
classification is “evidently not arbitrary like the grouping of stars in constellations” (Darwin, 
1859, p. 411). Nor is a true classification a revelation of the order of creation – Darwin says that 
knowing an order of creation would give us no additional information about nature (Darwin, 
1859, p. 413). However, Darwin does favor the idea that classification should reflect a 
“something more” about nature: 
But many naturalists think that something more is meant by the Natural System; they 
believe that it reveals the plan of the Creator; but unless it be specified whether order in 
time or space, or what else is meant by the plan of the Creator, it seems to me that 
nothing is thus added to our knowledge. Such expressions as that famous one of 
Linnaeus, and which we often meet with in a more or less concealed form, that the 
characters do not make the genus, but that the genus gives the characters, seem to imply 
that something more is included in our classification, than mere resemblance (Darwin, 
1859, p. 413). 
 
This phrase appears in Linnaeus’ Philosophia Botanica, in which he says that “A character does 
not exist to form a genus, but to make it known” (Linnaeus, 1751, p. 132). Darwin takes 
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Linnaeus’ statement as one of species realism – that classification is not of artifice but captures 
some real properties of nature. Linnaeus’ “something more,” however, does refer to the order of 
creation – characters make known the true structure of nature as created by a god. Darwin seeks 
to retain the realism implied by Linnaeus’ statement, but to replace the “something more” to 
which Linnaeus refers – for Darwin, the reality of species will not be grounded in creation. 
Darwin’s “something more” is genealogical history – the branching structure produced by 
descent from a common ancestor. The pattern that we observe as a result of common descent – 
“groups within groups,” as Darwin calls it, can be traced by observation and empirical methods, 
producing an accurate classification. For species to be real, in the Darwinian sense, is for them to 
be products of a historical process of genealogical descent. Rather than constructing definitions 
which make finite boundaries between species, we can treat species as vaguely-bounded groups 
that over time arrange in a branching structure. 
2.3.4 How Do We Identify a Real Species? 
If what makes species real is the process of community of descent, we must be able to determine 
that a group has, in fact, been produced by descent. Darwin criticizes the classificatory practices 
of his peers, whom he says focus too much on physiologically important characters, a method 
which leads to conflict and inaccurate classification. Instead, he recasts Linnaeus’ ideal of a 
natural system in an evolutionary context: 
All the forgoing rules and aids and difficulties in classification are explained, if I do not 
greatly deceive myself, on the view that the natural system is founded on descent with 
modification… I believe that the arrangement of the groups within each class, in due 
subordination and relation to the other groups, must be strictly genealogical in order to be 
natural; but that the amount of difference in the several branches or groups, though allied 
in the same degree in blood to their common progenitor, may differ greatly, being due to 
the different degrees of modification which they have undergone; and this is expressed by 
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the forms being ranked under different genera, families, sections, or orders (Darwin, 
1859, p. 420). 
 
In Darwin’s proposal that a classification based in descent would give us the natural organization 
of nature, we can find his test for the reality of a species. It is no longer the formulation of a 
definition based on detecting the natural delineations of species. Rather, Darwin’s test is the 
identification of features which reveal the structure of descent – characters which show us 
ancestry. This makes Darwin’s procedure for identifying species diagnostic rather than 
definitional – we can reasonably determine when a true species has been identified, though we 
cannot definitively locate a clear boundary.13 These features are most relevant for classification 
regardless of their other functions, a belief Darwin expresses when he writes, “Again, no one will 
say that rudimentary or atrophied organs are of high physiological or vital importance; yet, 
undoubtedly, organs in this condition are often of high value in classification” (Darwin, 1859, p. 
416). Linnaeus’ proposition that the genus gives the character is thus reinterpreted by Darwin: 
the genus (and other higher groupings, depending on degree of difference) is defined by shared 
characteristics inherited from a common ancestor. Based on the theory of common descent, if we 
can pick out the groups that are arranged in its requisite branching structure, we are justified in 
believing these are real species groups, not of artifice but of nature. 
2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Darwin does modify the species concept – he claims that those things which we call ‘species’ are 
not, in fact, immutable and distinct from something else that we call a ‘variety’. He also 
                                                 
13 The distinction between diagnostic and definitional species concepts is defended in Ghiselin (1984), and I thank 
John Beatty for helpful discussion on differently functioning species concepts. 
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maintains that species are some kind of real group laid out by nature in a way that scientists can 
empirically discover. But in order to so change the species concept while also maintaining 
species realism, he must make a further modification – a second conceptual shift, this time to the 
concept of species realism. On Darwin’s view, what it is for a species to be real is no longer for 
it to be naturally bounded. Rather, species are real in virtue of the fact that they are produced by 
a real process of descent, which creates the branching natural structure of organisms in groups 
within groups. Without redefining the notion of ‘real,’ Darwin modifies what it means for a 
species to be real by tying realism to his new theory of branching descent. 
He then must revise the test for species realism – the proper method to determine the 
relationships among organisms is to study shared characters which reveal ancestry. This 
modification allows Darwin to understand species in a way that relates species to the real, natural 
processes which caused them to come into being as we observe them. It makes species realism 
entirely compatible with evolutionary change, while in prior theories of evolution, it seemed that 
the belief in species realism must be discarded – on the Darwinian view, scientists can conceive 
of species as vaguely-bounded groups which are the product of important natural processes and 
have explanatory power in understanding other natural processes. 
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3.0  WHY IS DARWIN A SPECIES REALIST? 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, I showed that Darwin modifies the concept of species realism such that 
he can claim that if species are to be real groups, those groups need not be immutable and 
categorically distinct. I contrasted Darwin’s theory with Lamarck’s on this point: Lamarck is 
comfortable proposing a theory of evolutionary change without claiming that there are real 
groups in nature which we call ‘species.’ Acceptance of gradualism and mutability alone, then, is 
not enough to drive a change in what it is for species to be real. In the last chapter I asked how 
Darwin could be a species realist; here I ask why he is. Why does Darwin not choose the 
Lamarckian, anti-realist route? Here, I explore some of Darwin’s motivation to be a species 
realist, when he might reasonably have chosen not to be. 
I noted earlier that for Carl Linnaeus, the distinctions among species, and between 
species and varieties, are present due to the will of God. Generally, this is true for each naturalist 
who believes in a form of special creation (though the details of individual beliefs about creation 
differ among them). This observation – that there is a role for a creator in understanding species 
– raises an important question which I have not yet addressed. I have shown that several 
influential predecessors and contemporaries of Darwin took immutability and category 
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distinctness as “part of what it means for a species to be real.” But this notion needs further 
explanation. Which “part”? Why are these properties associated with species realism? 
I will answer this question by exploring the role of origin accounts in the species realism. 
My investigation into the role of origin account in species realism will further illuminate the 
association between immutability and category distinctness with species realism: as I will show, 
these properties are associated with species realism when that realism is dependent upon an 
origin account for species in a particular way. Specifically, I will argue that this is true in the 
case of Charles Lyell, for whom species realism is dependent upon his belief in special 
creation.14  
The difference between Lyell’s and Darwin’s origin account that has consequences for 
species realism is in the character of the cause described: Lyell’s origin account (i.e., his 
assignment of causal responsibility for the appearance of new species) is an instantaneous cause 
which happens throughout the course of nature. As I will show, Darwin’s species realism is also 
dependent upon his origin account, but differently. His origin account will be a process of 
change: I argue that while Darwin and his species realist contemporaries both hold a realist 
stance which relies on their proposed origin accounts, Darwin’s realism has a new motivation: in 
his theory, species themselves are causally involved in the origin account for new species. Thus, 
although Darwin rejects the origin account upon which Lyell’s realism is dependent, his own 
theory provides a different reason that realism depends on origin account. And this different 
causal role for his origin account illuminates a distinction between the origin of new species and 
the primary origin of organic life. 
                                                 
14 There are numerous possible interpretations of special creation held by different naturalists at the time. I have 
chosen to contrast Darwin and Lyell because of Lyell’s influence on Darwin and because of his arguments which 
seek explanations by secondary causes and thus give a rather complex role to an Author of Nature. 
 25 
The chapter is structured as follows: I first show that Lyell’s species realism is dependent 
upon his origin account and detail the way in which it is dependent. I then show that Darwin’s 
species realism is similarly dependent upon his origin account, but that in his case the 
dependence is related to the causal power of species within Darwin’s theory. I conclude by 
showing that this difference helps to explain why Darwin is motivated to maintain species 
realism despite rejecting that which the realism of his peers depends upon. 
3.2 PROPERTIES, ORIGINS, & ORIGIN ACCOUNTS: LYELL’S SPECIES 
REALISM 
In this section I detail particular kind of dependence that exists between Charles Lyell’s species 
realist stance and his belief in special creation as an origin account. His case is interesting for 
two reasons: first, his work, especially his Principles of Geology (PG) had a major impact on 
Darwin as he formulated his theory. Second, Lyell makes wholly empirical arguments when he 
makes scientific claims about species and species realism, but afterwards invokes special 
creation as an origin for new species. Lyell, though primarily committed to discovering 
secondary laws set by an Author of Nature, did reserve a role for a creator in his theory, and this 
creator was ultimately responsible for species and their properties (including their natural 
boundaries, their limits to variation). 
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3.2.1 Realism Dependent Upon Origin Account 
In Lyell’s case, the properties of species which are associated with his species realism 
(immutability and category distinctness) are dependent upon his origin account. In order to show 
a dependence of properties upon origins, I must make clear the distinction between the two. The 
discussion in the previous chapter was almost exclusively concerned with properties. 
Immutability and category distinctness are, for Darwin’s peers, properties of real species. Their 
origin, by contrast, is the source of their reality. For example, in this case the origin of species is 
creation by God, and, because they were so created, they have certain properties, namely, they 
are immutable and distinct from varieties. 
We can say, then, that Lyell’s species realism is dependent upon his origin account – the 
source of their reality is the circumstances of their creation. Lyell’s species realism is dependent 
upon his origin account, and the properties of immutability and category distinctness are also 
dependent upon the origin account. Their origin is the source of their reality and also their 
properties, and therefore, those are the properties of real species, which we detect empirically. 
Contrast this with realism dependent instead upon properties – for example, one could be a 
realist about the chemical substance of water regardless of its particular synthesis pathway.15 
The example of water is illustrative, but a properties-dependent realism about species is 
possible as well, though we see it much later in the history of the species concept: Consider the 
Biological Species Concept, in which the reality of species is dependent upon their reproductive 
potential. Their reproductive potential might be dependent on their genealogical history (and 
thus, origin), but their reality is directly dependent on the property of reproductive potential. 
                                                 
15 I owe this example to discussion with Aaron Novick and Sandra Mitchell, which was motivated by Chang (2012). 
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Modern conceptions of species realism dependent on origins might include an understanding of 
species as spatiotemporally extended individuals, like those of Ghiselin (1974) and Hull (1976). 
This discussion of upon what our species realism depends, then, might be of relevance to the 
modern species problem. 
3.2.2 The Role of Origin Account for Lyell’s Realism 
I’ve claimed that Lyell’s species realism is dependent upon his origin account, and I’ve shown 
how this might reasonably be the case. I now support that claim and complete the connection 
between Lyell’s realism and his origin account. What is the historical case for the dependence of 
Lyell’s species realism upon his origin account of special creation? 
I have shown that the hallmark of Lyell’s species realism is that we can empirically 
discover the limits to variation – by experiments in breeding and observations of hybrid 
infertility, we have evidence that there are natural boundaries beyond which organisms cannot 
vary while remaining viable. Recall that Lyell’s argument for the reality of species at the 
beginning of Volume II of PG is a targeted refutation of Lamarck’s theory of transformation. It is 
important to note that origin account – special creation – is not a part of this argument against 
Lamarck. It is, however, part of the conclusion of the argument. Consider this list (paraphrased) 
in which Lyell summarizes the support for his main claim that Lamarck’s theory is 
unsubstantiated by evidence, and we need not conclude that species are real in nature: 
1. Organisms of the same species do vary; the degree to which they vary is dependent upon 
the particular species. Thus, some species vary greatly while others vary less. This occurs 
in response to external circumstances. 
2. This degree of allowed variation is part of the specific character. 
3. Acquired traits, instincts, or abilities are only heritable when they are closely related to 
the behaviors and habits of the organism in its natural state; unusual or uncharacteristic 
behaviors are not heritable. 
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4. The extent of variation can be observed in a relatively short period of time, and beyond 
these limitations, organisms cannot survive. This is demonstrated empirically by 
domestic breeding. 
5. Organisms are averse to interspecific breeding, which maintains the natural boundaries 
between one species and another. Hybrids are only perpetuated by breeding with “pure 
species,” and are thus not independently sustainable. 
6. “From the above considerations, it appears that species have a real existence in nature, 
and that each was endowed, at the time of its creation, with the attributes and 
organization by which it is now distinguished” (Lyell (1832, pp. 64-65)). 
 
It is clear from Lyell’s sixth point that, minimally, origin account has something to do with 
species realism – once we have found natural limits to variation and concluded that therefore 
species are real, we can immediately also conclude that each was created with its present 
properties. But this is also puzzling – why does Lyell add this claim to his conclusions, when 
special creation did not enter into his argument at any point prior? It is curious that Lyell should 
make a wholly empirical argument against Lamarck and then make an unexpected conclusion 
about special creation. His conclusion is that his refutation to Lamarck is sufficient to say that we 
need not reject the idea that God created specific forms – he does not (and need not) here argue 
for special creation, he believes but does not seek to prove that special creation is ultimately 
responsible for each property of species. 
 Is there a stronger claim to be made here? I propose that Lyell’s species realism is 
dependent upon special creation in this particular sense: special creation is the source of reality 
for species and the source of all their properties, but it does little further work in explaining the 
appearance of new species. While a creator is ultimately responsible for every property of 
species, this is all we can learn from focusing on the creation, and the rest of our scientific 
inquiry belongs in uncovering the laws and properties produced by that creator. 
Because the argument in PG Chapter IV cited above is not concerned with the details of 
Lyell’s belief in special creation, I turn instead to the first journal in Sir Charles Lyell’s Scientific 
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Journals on the Species Question (Lyell, 1855-1856) for evidence. Two entries will be of interest 
here – the first is from 1855, and the second from a year later, in 1856. The significance of the 
first entry is to summarize quite nicely Lyell’s view on the role of the creator in the behavior and 
property of species, which is consistent with his argument for their reality in PG. The 
significance of the second is to show Lyell questioning his prior views – Lyell begins to 
reconsider those things which he once said were the marks of real species and considers what it 
might look like to explain the appearance of new species. This will show Lyell’s concern about 
just the thing that I’ve claimed his origin story does not do. 
In the first entry, Lyell lays out some general principles of an Author of Nature who acts 
according to detectable and predictable regularities. He claims that: 
Assuming therefore certain laws similar to those which require gills in a fish & lungs in a 
bird & certain constitution to endure great cold & to enable a species to fight its way & 
stand its ground against others, a new species cannot at any given period be created 
arbitrarily. Assuming that Omnipotence rules by self-imposed laws, by which alone 
Man can comprehend the Universe (Lyell, 1855-1856, p. 4), emphasis mine. 
 
Prior to this, Lyell has already established that extinction must occur and “new ones must come 
in or the Earth would be depopulated” (Lyell, 1855-1856, p. 4). This means that new species 
must be created in such a way that they fit well in their environments, consistent with the fit we 
observe in already existing species. This principle may lead to the creation of similar species – 
for example, species within the same genus – if their conditions for existence are similar (Lyell, 
1855-1856, p. 6). 
 But here is the interesting case, where the role of the creator is made clear: Lyell makes 
an argument in which he shows that two very similar species on two islands, distinct for a long 
time but close enough for migration, are more likely to have been created once and one migrated 
than for two independent creations to have occurred. It is within this argument that he clearly 
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shows that the role of the creator is to place each new species with its long-term fate determined: 
The starting of each species from one point seems consistent with the simplicity of 
Nature… If I place a species each on two or more islands of a group at first, or a 
species capable of spreading in time to the same islands, the same forethought is 
required in an omniscient being, or one capable of grappling with so profound a 
problem. The idea of providing for the continuance of the species by a precaution, such 
as placing it simultaneously at first in a multitude of spots so that some one of these may 
succeed, is obviously to assimilate the creative power to a being of limited prescience. It 
may be the occasion of spreading to another island of the group may not be destined to 
occur for a myriad of centuries & in this time the island will be submerged; if so, the 
species will not be placed there but in some other island, if a myriad be too short a period. 
The creation therefore of species from single original stocks may imply a higher 
foreknowledge of future events (Lyell, 1855-1856, p. 7) emphasis mine. 
 
To summarize Lyell’s general principle: extinction occurs, so we must allow some mechanism of 
species introduction, for which the Author of Nature is responsible in some regular and 
detectable way. Often it is introduction of varieties by migration, but it can be newly created 
species – we can see this when Lyell discusses the “forethought” required in creating species that 
are intended to persist for determinate amounts of time. This is the crucial role of a creator in the 
fate of species – the Author of Nature, at the time of creation (whichever time that may be) has in 
mind, so to speak, all the properties and the fate of the species. And these creations happen in a 
regular way, according to the self-imposed laws of the creator. 
On April 29, 1856, Lyell writes an entry titled “Origin & Reality of Species.” He begins: 
After conversation with Mill, Huxley, Hooker, Carpenter & Busk at Philos. Club, 
conclude that the belief in species as permanent, fixed & invariable, & as comprehending 
individuals descending from a single pairs or protoplasts is growing fainter – no very 
clear creed to substitute. Indefinite time & change may, according to Lamarckian views, 
work such alterations as will end in races, which are as fixed [as] the negro for example 
& unalterable for the period of human observation, as are any known species such as the 
Ibis cited by Cuvier…The successive creation of species is a perpetual series of 
miraculous interferences instead of the government of the organic creation by 
general laws. Huxley shows that types intermediate between Mammalia & Birds & other 
great divisions are not met with in Geology as they would be if there was a continual 
development from one original type. Were there many first germs? (Lyell, 1855-1856, p. 
57), emphasis mine. 
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While Lyell certainly does not discard his previous views about a creator operating under self-
imposed laws, he seems to be reconsidering whether it is consistent with the idea of self-imposed 
natural laws to repeatedly interfere with the creation of new species. Lyell’s reconsideration is 
consistent with my claim that his initial views on successive species creation identify only an 
instantaneous, intervening cause, which does not account for a process of species production, 
though it seems this is what Lyell wants. 
 At the end of this entry, Lyell concludes with a speculative statement about what it might 
look like to have a natural origin account for species that does factor directly into their reality: 
The dignity of Geology would no doubt gain could we once conclude with any feeling of 
certainty, that the progressive development theory, the origination of species from 
modifications resulting from geological changes & a tendency to improvement, 
accompanying those modifications, were true – for then geology, ethnology and history 
would blend into one & the books of God’s works would unfold to us by degrees the 
physical history of our species as well as of the beings which are now our 
contemporaries. But at present the mystery involving the subject does not appear to 
diminish. Our time of observation and of comparison of living & extinct nature is too 
short (Lyell, 1855-1856, p. 60). 
 
I conclude, then, that the creator has this role in Lyell’s species realism: The Author of Nature is 
responsible for every species and every aspect of each species. And those properties which allow 
us to discover the limits of variation show us that the putative species is indeed one of the 
Author’s works. But, this is the extent of the causal responsibility of the Author of Nature – 
Lyell’s special creation does not provide a clear explanation for the appearance of new species, 
as their introduction seems to be a process while his mechanism of their introduction seems to be 
instantaneous. 
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3.3 DARWIN’S NEW ORIGIN ACCOUNT AND MOTIVATION TO BE A SPECIES 
REALIST 
3.3.1 Realism Dependent Upon Origin Account, Again  
Given that Darwin rejects the origin account which is the source of reality for contemporary 
species realists, we might expect that Darwin should be more motivated to say that species are 
not real. Again, it often seems like this is the case. Why not throw out species realism with 
special creation, as Lamarck did?16 Indeed, why be a realist about groups at all? The entities in 
Darwin’s theory might be lines of descent, or only the individual organisms. Yet he believes that 
groups (and species) are real in nature. That Darwin’s species realism is dependent upon his 
origin account is a consequence of the argument I made in the first chapter. Darwin’s origin 
account of new species is descent from a common ancestor: a new species is produced as 
ancestral species diverge over many generations. If it is community of descent, rather than 
immutability and distinctness which marks a true species, then Darwin’s species realism is 
rooted in this community of descent. 
 But so far, I have only shown a parallel with Lyell: both naturalists’ species realist stance 
is rooted in their respective origin accounts. What is different about the dependence in Darwin’s 
case? Answering this question should illustrate a reason for Darwin to be a realist about species-
as-groups without holding the belief that motivates Lyell’s. I argue that the answer is this: In 
Darwin’s theory, species, and importantly, species as groups of organisms are causally 
fundamental. Darwin is working with a standard of identifying natural causes espoused by John 
                                                 
16 Note that Lamarck did believe in an Author of Nature, and thus did not reject creation, but being a species anti-
realist, rejected special creation. 
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Herschel. Darwin’s commitment to Herschel’s standard, and his claim that species-as-groups are 
acting causally in natural selection will lead him to species realism. 
3.3.2 Darwin and the Vera Causa Principle 
Of what is Darwin seeking a cause, and what sort of cause is he seeking? Ultimately, Darwin’s 
goal is to explain observations about the geographic distribution and strong correlation of traits 
between organisms and other organisms and their environment (and the explanation is evolution 
by natural selection). He wants to explain the apparent structure in nature, including the way that 
organisms seem to be well-suited to their environment and well-coordinated with other species. 
Darwin intends to explain these observations about nature by identifying a vera causa, as 
articulated by John Herschel. He subscribes to what M.J.S. Hodge calls the vera causa principle 
(VCP) (Hodge, 1977, p. 238). 
 When Hodge discusses the VCP, he is drawing from Herschel’s philosophy of science as 
published in in A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy. Herschel 
characterizes the study of the natural world as a search for causes: 
Again, when he contemplates still more attentively the thoughts, act, and passions of this 
is sentient intelligent self, he finds… above all, that he is irresistibly impelled, from the 
perception of any phenomenon without or within him, to infer the existence of 
something prior which stands to in the relation of a cause, without which it would 
not be… He finds, too, that it is in his power to acquire more or less knowledge of causes 
and effects according to the degree of attention he bestows upon them, which attention is 
again in great measure a voluntary act; and often when his choice has been decided on 
imperfect knowledge or insufficient attention, he finds reason to correct his judgement, 
though perhaps too late to influence his decision by after consideration. A world within 
him is thus opened to his intellectual view, abounding with phenomena and relations, and 
of the highest immediate interest (Herschel, 1851, pp. 5-6) emphasis mine. 
 
Hodge, analyzing Herschel and the VCP, describes these standards for identifying causes in 
nature: 
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As a rough approximation, then, we may take the whole rule or principle to specify the 
following: in explaining any phenomenon, one should invoke only causes whose 
existence and competence to produce such an effect can be known independently of their 
putative responsibility for that phenomenon (Hodge, 1977, p. 239). 
 
Additionally, some further information about vera causae from Herschel will be important here – 
first about real causes, and second about analogies. Herschel makes this explicit point about non-
artificial causes: 
Experience having shown us the manner in which one phenomenon depends on another 
in a great variety of cases, we find ourselves provided, as science extends, with a 
continually increasing stock of such antecedent phenomena, or causes (meaning at 
present merely proximate causes), competent, under different modifications, to the 
production of a great multitude of effects, besides those which originally led to a 
knowledge of them. To such causes Newton has applied the term vera causae; that is, 
causes recognized as having a real existence in nature, and not being mere 
hypotheses or figments of the mind (Herschel, 1851, p. 144) emphasis mine. 
 
I will return to the emphasized portion of this quotation later to further discuss the relationship 
between realism and causality for Darwin. But Herschel also claims that identifying analogous 
causes is a strong way to identify true causes. He writes, “If the analogy of two phenomena be 
very close and striking, while, at the same time, the cause of one is very obvious, it becomes 
scarcely possible to refuse to admit the action of an analogous cause in the other, though not so 
obvious in itself” (Herschel, 1851, p. 149). 
 I accept Hodge’s argument as good evidence that Darwin does indeed subscribe to the 
VCP as a standard for identifying causes in scientific study.17 His argument for Darwin’s 
adherence to the VCP is summarized as follows: 
…in conforming his argumentation to that ideal, Darwin knowingly constructed three 
distinct, evidential cases, three component arguments, on behalf of natural selection: first, 
a case for its existence as a causal process going on in the world; second, a case for its 
adequacy, its competence to produce, adapt and diversify species; and, third, a case for its 
responsibility, for, that is, its having produced the species now living and the extinct 
species found as fossils. So, in sum, natural selection exists, it can have that sort and size 
                                                 
17 But see Lennox (2005) for further discussion on Darwin’s methodological influences in this regard. 
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of effect, and it has indeed formed the species that have originated so far (Hodge, 1992, 
p. 462). 
 
Another line of evidence for Darwin’s commitment to the VCP is his strategy of argument by 
analogy. The cause of changes in domestic animal species is selection by man – Darwin argues 
that an analogous but more powerful cause acts in nature to produce the organisms with the 
properties that we observe. From these considerations, we can conclude that Darwin did seek to 
align his theory with the VCP. But this tells us about the structure of Darwin’s argument for 
natural selection, not species realism. When Darwin replaces the origin account of special 
creation with the vera causa natural selection, what consequences will this philosophical 
commitment have on his views about species groups as natural entities? 
3.3.3 A Causal Role for Species Leads to Species Realism 
How does understanding Darwin’s standards for causes connect origin account with species 
realism – i.e., how do these beliefs about causality help to motivate Darwin’s species realism? I 
argue that the answer is that species – the actual group-ness of species – has a causal role in 
Darwin’s theory. And, as Herschel claims, true causes must not be artificial. I extend this to 
claim that since Darwin’s species groups are causal, they must not be artificial. I do not mean to 
say that Darwin wishes to call species a perfect example of a vera causa, and accordingly I do 
not seek a complete proof of species as existing, competent, and responsible for some 
phenomenon.  Natural selection is overall what Darwin is trying to prove as an existing, 
competent, responsible cause for the production of new species (and this is what Hodge (1977) 
demonstrates). But, as another consequence, the VCP connects realism with causality for 
Darwin. 
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 First, recall from the Herschel passage above that true causes must be “causes recognized 
as having a real existence in nature, and not being mere hypotheses or figments of the mind” 
(Herschel, 1851, p. 144). I will establish that are species-as-groups causal for Darwin, and then 
that this commitment to their causal power motivates his commitment to their reality in nature. 
 Species, importantly species-as-groups (as opposed to individuals or lineages) are 
required to produce the branching pattern that Darwin proposes: 
The several subordinate groups in any class cannot be ranked in a single file, but seem 
rather to be clustered round points, and these round other points, and so on in almost 
endless cycles. On the view that each species has been independently created, I can see 
no explanation of this great fact in the classification of all organic beings; but, to the best 
of my judgement, it is explained through inheritance and the complex action of natural 
selection, entailing extinction and divergence of character, as we have seen illustrated in 
the diagram (Darwin, 1859, pp. 128-129). 
 
As we saw in Darwin’s discussion on classification, Darwin thought that seeing the tree structure 
of nature connected the apparent groups which are used for classification with their natural 
properties, thereby acknowledging causal power of the groups to contribute to the divergence of 
new groups. 
 In what way are species causal in the production of new species? And how does this 
contrast with the way that an Author of Nature is causal in the production of new species for 
Lyell? Darwin’s species are both produced by ancestral species, and the producers of descendent 
ones. Evolution occurs when natural selection acts on an ancestral species. Darwin’s principle of 
natural selection is based on the struggle for existence: selection allows only those organisms 
best suited to their environment to survive to reproduce. It thus relies on relative degree of 
adaptation – selected individuals are so selected because they are better suited than their 
conspecifics; in modern terms, this is relative fitness. Relative fitness only exists within a group, 
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giving the species group a causal role in Darwin’s theory. Species groups are produced by a 
process which requires groups. 
If the groups which we call species were to be artificial, we would not find evidence 
suggesting a causal role for their being groups, nor for the things on the basis of which we group 
them. That is, if Darwin believes he has evidence that species act causally in the production of 
new species, he has evidence that these groups are not artificial. His origin account for new 
species is a process which requires ancestral species. This can be contrasted with the origin of 
new species by creation, which in Lyell’s case motivates realism by stipulating natural 
boundaries. Therefore, community of descent, which I have argued is tied to species realism, 
provides the basis for Darwin to believe that species are causal in the production of new species. 
His species realism is thus motivated. 
3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
I’ve shown that species-as-groups are causally participating in a process of change – species 
participate by producing new species. And this causal participation motivates Darwin to believe 
that species are real in nature, not artificial. Contrast this with Lyell’s belief that an Author of 
Nature repeatedly though predictably creates a species with its fate and all its properties 
determined. In Darwin’s case, species realism is dependent upon an origin story which forms a 
causal process, while in Lyell’s, species realism is dependent upon an instantaneous determinant 
cause. From this comparison we can see that while Darwin rejects special creation as an origin 
account, he is confronted with a new motivation to be a species realist, and thus holds a different 
realist stance that is nonetheless dependent upon his origin account. 
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 I have shown that the relationship between origin account and species realism for Darwin 
is similar to that of Lyell in one sense – realism is sourced from an origin account –  but different 
in another important one: Darwin’s origin account connects to his realism because he views 
species as active parts of a causal process. It seems that Darwin is attempting to do something 
like what Lyell speculates about in his journal entry (which makes sense, as Lyell there 
articulates a general scientific goal of his time). He is proposing a natural origin account for 
species that does not require the repeated intervention of a creator to produce new species. In 
making this proposal of origin account, Darwin is attributing causal power to species themselves. 
This, given his commitment to VCP standards of causation, motivates his position as a species 
realist. 
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4.0  CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE REVISION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters showed first how Darwin could be a species realist (by making certain 
modifications to the concepts SPECIES and SPECIES REALISM), and second gave one account of 
Darwin’s motivation to be a species realist (as a consequence of his particular change in origin 
account). In this chapter, I address together the questions of how and why Darwin is a species 
realist, though from a different angle. I shift my discussion from properties to concepts. The 
properties of species groups that I discussed in the first chapter are, as I will show, component 
concepts of the complex concept SPECIES. I will illustrate the modifications that Darwin effects in 
the concepts SPECIES and SPECIES REALISM in terms of conceptual structure. Specifically, I will 
show how the concept SPECIES REALISM is part of the structure of the concept SPECIES, and then 
explain how Darwin modifies both concepts simultaneously by means of piecemeal revision to 
this structure. 
The concept SPECIES, as I will show, incorporates the concept SPECIES REALISM in its 
structure, along with other component concepts. I will show that Darwin’s modifications are 
these: (1) a modification to the concept SPECIES by revising the content of the concept (which 
component concepts it contains) and (2) a modification to the relationships among component 
concepts, including a modification to SPECIES REALISM where he revises its relationships within 
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the structure of SPECIES. In establishing this structural framework picture of the conceptual shifts 
that Darwin initiates in these two concepts, I will make an argument for how Darwin can make 
fundamental revisions to the concept SPECIES while maintaining the reference of the term 
‘species.’ I argue that the conceptual change occurring in this case amounts to a modification to 
the non-referential semantic structure of SPECIES, and that this characterization captures Darwin’s 
ability to make fundamental revisions to the content of SPECIES without altering its reference. 
I am making a claim about scientific change: Darwin’s work on the species question 
shows a particular kind of complex revision of a theory and its component concepts. This can be 
contrasted with theory change which prompts scientists to wholly reject some of the concepts in 
the “old” theories. I will first characterize the structure of the content of the concept SPECIES – I 
will draw briefly on some theory of concepts in cognitive science and justify this approach to 
understanding conceptual change in SPECIES. I then address the role of SPECIES REALISM as a 
component concept in the structure of SPECIES. I then discuss Darwin’s maintenance of the 
reference of the concept SPECIES, a topic briefly mentioned in the first paper, before defending 
my central claim about conceptual structure revision. I show why this particular kind of revision 
allows Darwin to make significant changes to the concept SPECIES without losing its reference. 
4.2 CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE 
4.2.1 The Concept SPECIES 
In this section I give a philosophical framework for understanding the species concept – or 
rather, as we will see, species concepts (plural). I claim that the content of the species concept is 
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best represented in terms of its conceptual structure beyond that of definition. Accordingly, I 
address what I mean by ‘conceptual structure,’ and then justify this approach to studying the 
concept ‘species’ and its development in scientific theories. I then sketch a general way that the 
naturalists I have studied build up conceptual structure for their individual species concepts. This 
last point is intentionally broad; I will give a more detailed picture of their species concept 
structures in the section describing the revisions that Darwin makes. 
 There is certainly a way of characterizing SPECIES in the classical sense of a concept: we 
can think of ‘species’ as a term with a definition, and that the concept is individuated by those 
definitional criteria (Margolis & Laurence, 1999). Conceptual structure, broadly, describes the 
component concepts of some lexical concept like SPECIES (Margolis & Laurence, 1999). It 
seems, then, that a definition of ‘species’ would be a minimal account of the concept’s structure: 
a list of necessary and sufficient conditions to be met in order for some group of organisms to be 
a species. It is precisely this kind of concept structure that has so eluded scientists and 
philosophers. There is, however, a more inclusive and appropriate alternative. Margolis and 
Laurence, in their survey of types of concept structure, give several (competing) alternatives to 
the structure afforded by the classical notion of concepts. The classical notion falls into a 
category they call “compositional reference-determining structure.” They give another category, 
termed “non-referential semantic structure,” which includes structure that does not determine 
reference of a concept, but contributes to the content of the concept: 
The suggestion is that a concept can have structure that is partially constitutive of its 
content even if the structure isn’t implicated in an account of the concept’s reference. The 
thing we want to emphasize is that this is a different position than the Fregean view that 
there is more to the meaning of a concept than its reference. After all, it was part of the 
Fregean program that sense determines reference. In contrast, the present suggestion is 
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that in addition to a reference, concepts have another aspect to their content, but one that 
doesn’t determine their reference (Margolis & Laurence, 1999, p. 73).18 
 
From my study of the history of the species concept, I am led to adopt this sort of understanding 
of its structure.19 Importantly, it allows for fundamental changes in the content of the species 
concept without affecting basic claims about reference, which seems to be what Darwin has 
done. 
 Including component concepts other than definitional criteria in giving an account of 
some naturalist’s species concept is justified because it allows recognition of the importance of 
the relationships among component concepts. To think of SPECIES only in the classical, 
definitional sense would be limited in that it would lack an account of these relationships. The 
species concept seems in a sense bigger than a term with a definition – it seems to incorporate 
commitments to other concepts, and different species concepts seem to incorporate different 
commitments, all while being used to talk about the same thing. The relationships among the 
component concepts are crucial to the representing and understanding some particular 
naturalist’s species concept. Therefore, it is more appropriate to adopt a broader structural 
understanding of the species concept. This characterization acknowledges SPECIES as a complex 
concept, rather than a simple term with a definition. The structures of the species concepts of 
those naturalists which I have studied are composed of some collection and the relationships 
among such basic concepts as these: species realism, immutability, categorical distinctness, 
definition, etc. By “relationships among” the concepts I capture what I described in my first 
                                                 
18 It should be noted that Margolis and Laurence are giving a survey of theories about concepts in the context of 
cognitive science. “Non-referential semantic structure” describes a category of concept theories, rather than one 
particular theory. They note that “some two-factor conceptual role theories may fall in this category.” In this paper I 
intend not to give a detailed argument for this type of theory as a best among types of concept theories, but I adopt it 
as at the least a useful and appropriate way of characterizing the concept ‘species’ in a way that is charitable to the 
concept’s role in scientific theories. 
19 Background literature on psychological concepts, including Weiskopf (2009), and conceptual & theory change, 
including Kitcher (1978) and Stanford and Kitcher (2000) were helpful in forming this framework. 
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chapter: that certain commitments about the nature of species seem to be tied together in that a 
naturalist cannot accept one without the other. 
 
 
Figure 1. Species Concept Structures 
Lyell’s species concept (SPECIESLy) contains CATEGORY DISTINCTNESS and IMMUTABILITY bound up with REALISM. 
Lamarck’s species concept (SPECIESLa) rejects all three associated component concepts. 
 
This kind of broad inclusive understanding of species concept structure is important as it allows 
Darwin a smooth concept revision while maintaining reference, a concern for other writers on 
this topic. I further discuss this maintenance of reference as a crucial aspect of Darwin’s 
revisions in 4.3, which spells out in detail the structural revisions Darwin makes. 
SPECIESLy 
SPECIESLa 
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4.2.2 The Concept SPECIES REALISM 
In this section I explore the structure of the concept SPECIES REALISM. As I noted in the previous 
section, SPECIES REALISM is a component concept within the structure of the concept SPECIES. 
How is SPECIES REALISM different from SPECIES? SPECIES REALISM is a component of the 
structure SPECIES in the sense that should a naturalist be identified as a species realist, the claim 
that species are produced by some natural process or properties will be included in a complete 
account of that naturalist’s species concept. Consider Figure 1. Species Concept Structures – 
note that SPECIESLy includes REALISM, but SPECIESLa does not. Additionally, the concept does not 
seem to have the same extensive structural network.20 SPECIES REALISM will either be excluded 
or included in the structure of some naturalist’s species concept. 
 But – I am talking about species realism as a concept (SPECIES REALISM) as opposed to 
species realism as merely a question about the reference of another concept (namely, the concept 
SPECIES). The objection is this: is SPECIES REALISM really its own concept, and a component 
concept of SPECIES? Or is a species realist simply someone who claims that the term ‘species’ 
does, in fact, refer? Thinking of SPECIES REALISM as a concept rather than a question about 
whether or not ‘species’ refers is correct because it captures a distinction that I made in the first 
chapter: the relevant question here is whether or not species are real in nature. The distinction is 
between real and artificial, not between referring and non-referring. Darwin makes this 
distinction himself in The Origin. He writes, “From the first dawn of life, all organic beings are 
found to resemble each other in descending degrees, so that they can be classed in groups under 
                                                 
20 I might even say they are different kinds of concepts: ‘species realism’ refers to a stance that apparent groups of 
organisms are so apparent due to natural grouping processes. The structure of ‘species realism’ then will not contain 
other concepts in the same way that ‘species’ does. 
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groups. This classification is evidently not arbitrary like the grouping of the stars in 
constellations” (Darwin, 1859, p. 411). In this quote, Darwin draws a distinction between 
referring vs. non-referring on one hand, and realist vs. nominalist on the other. This allows an 
explanation of the case of Lamarck, for example: he is a species anti-realist, and yet he continues 
using the term ‘species’ in explaining his own theory. For a species anti-realist, the term refers 
minimally to the apparent groups that other naturalists pick out as species. But Lamarck need not 
remain committed to the idea that nature, by some process, formed those groups. 
4.3 STRUCTURAL REVISIONS IN SPECIES REALISM AND SPECIES 
In this section, I argue for my central claim that a detailed account of piecemeal framework 
revision describes how Darwin can make conceptual structure revisions which fundamentally 
alter the content of his species concept but do not affect its reference. What is the concern here? 
Darwin and his contemporaries (for example again, Charles Lyell) use the same term to refer to 
the same thing, and yet they have significantly different species concepts (see Figure 2. 
Comparing Term, Concept, and Referent). 
 
Figure 2. Comparing Term, Concept, and Referent 
Darwin and Lyell (for example) use the same term to name the same referent but hold concepts with different 
content and structure. 
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This combines my how and why questions: Darwin has (probably) many reasons for maintaining 
the reference of the term ‘species,’ and the way in which he revises the concept should be 
centered around maintaining that reference.21 
4.3.1 Determining Reference for SPECIES 
When Beatty (1985) makes the claim about Darwin’s communication strategy in The Origin, he 
first explains that Darwin is in fact a species realist, despite some suspiciously anti-realist 
comments in The Origin. Importantly, he makes the claim that Darwin thought his fellow 
naturalists were pointing at the things in nature which are rightly called species – i.e., SPECIES, 
for Darwin and his contemporaries, named the same referent, though their respective claims 
about species properties differed. This tells us that Darwin was a species realist, and Beatty in 
the rest of his paper gives one reason why – that Darwin’s goals were primarily to do with 
communicating his theory to other naturalists (Beatty, 1985, p. 228). 
 What contributes to the reference determination of SPECIES? What I called a “test” for 
real species in the first chapter is related to a method for determining the reference for the 
concept SPECIES. In the sense that I described, the two tests are different: in one case naturalists 
look for constituent definitions, and in the other case (Darwin’s), we should look for characters 
which reveal ancestry. However, there is a similarity between these “tests” in a broad, practical 
sense: in both cases, scientists should look for shared characters.22 And there is another test – 
                                                 
21 I direct the reader again to Stamos (2007). Stamos argues that the conceptual revision Darwin makes to the 
concept SPECIES is primarily to its extension; I do not respond to Stamos here, though this would be an immediate 
future direction for this argument. 
22 Though the details of which shared characters are to be counted is often quite contentious. 
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reproductive continuity.23 Recall that Linnaeus partially determined the boundaries of varieties 
within species by assessing reproductive continuity – he wrote that “[t]he number of varieties is 
the number of differing plants that are produced from the seed of the same species” (Linnaeus, 
1751, pp. 113-114) emphasis mine. And in Lyell’s argument against Lamarck, reproductive 
continuity helps to determine species because different species are averse to hybridization (Lyell, 
1832, p. 49). These concepts – SHARED CHARACTERS and REPRODUCTIVE CONTINUITY are 
component concepts of SPECIES for Darwin and his peers, and these do contribute to reference 
(though neither is sufficient in all cases). The others mentioned, though clearly crucial to the 
concept’s content, do not contribute to reference. 
4.3.2 Revising the Structure of SPECIES 
Major theory changes sometimes bring with them radical conceptual change, especially with 
regards to existential commitments. The concept ‘phlogiston’ was famously rejected as non-
referential in response to changing theories about combustion. We might reasonably be on the 
lookout for this type of shift in Darwin – after all, the theory of natural selection requires species 
to do things that many others deemed theoretically and empirically impossible (namely, changed 
somehow in order to produce new species). 
      But Kitcher (1978) suggests the referential story is somewhat more complicated, and 
both Stanford and Kitcher (2000) and Stanford (2015) are unsatisfied with idea that these kinds 
of changes as the most significant mode of conceptual change in science.24 And it does not seem 
                                                 
23 Reproductive continuity is very important to the history of the species concept, and there is a detailed analysis to 
be done about it, though unfortunately I cannot do it here. 
24 Though in a slightly different context – they are primarily engaged in debates about scientific realism as a whole, 
which, though not irrelevant to my discussion here, is not quite what I am arguing about. 
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to be the mode of change for SPECIES. Lamarck did not abandon the use of the concept SPECIES, 
even though he was a species anti-realist. And even when Darwin made fundamental revisions to 
the content of SPECIES, he retained its reference. Maybe we should not be surprised –  a concept 
so old and variable as SPECIES should be expected to change in complex ways throughout time. 
 I give a way of looking at concept change in SPECIES in the face of significant theory 
change about organisms and evolution (namely, the proposition of evolution by natural selection) 
which describes complex revision and explains, at least in part, the persistence of certain terms 
and referents. This is a descriptive account of this particular shift in the concept SPECIES. 
Depiction of conceptual structure in a framework is not unpopular – a comment by Carl Hempel 
in his Philosophy of Natural Science is similar to what I am describing: 
Scientific systemization requires the establishment of diverse connections, by laws or 
theoretical principles, between different aspects of the empirical world, which are 
characterized by scientific concepts. Thus, the concepts of science are the knots in a 
network of systematic interrelationships in which laws and theoretical principles form the 
threads. The more threads converge upon, or issue from, a conceptual knot, the stronger 
will be its systematizing role, or its systematic import (Hempel, 1966, p. 94). 
 
I wish to use something like this model to describe the internal structure of concepts, and also to 
make it dynamic – to use it to account for conceptual change. In this case, I want to use it to 
construct frameworks for SPECIES that incorporate and allow for change in non-referential 
semantic structure. To reiterate what I argued in the first chapter: Darwin undoes an association 
between immutability and category distinctness on one hand and species realism on the other. I 
argue here that this is a revision in the structure of the concept SPECIES, namely, the component 
concept SPECIES REALISM is tied with IMMUTABILITY and CATEGORY DISTINCTNESS such that 
other naturalists include or exclude them together in the conceptual structure. The idea that what 
makes species real is their strict natural boundaries is a theoretical principle which binds the two 
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concepts. Darwin’s revision is to untie those – deny that principle – and reconfigure the structure 
of SPECIES. 
 
 
Figure 3. Darwin's Conceptual Structure Revision 
Overall, the conceptual structure for Darwin’s species concept (SPECIESD) is formed by deletion of two 
components (CATEGORY DISTINCTNESS and IMMUTABILITY) and introduction of another (COMMUNITY OF DESCENT). 
And the relationships between SPECIES REALISM and the rest of the network have also been altered – REALISM is now 
tied to COMMUNITY OF DESCENT. CATEGORY DISTINCTNESS and IMMUTABILITY have been excluded together. 
 
As I argued in 4.3.2, the component concepts critically involved in determining reference 
are SHARED CHARACTERS and REPRODUCTIVE CONTINUITY, but not IMMUTABILITY, CATEGORY 
DISTINCTNESS, or COMMUNITY OF DESCENT. And this makes sense, because those things were 
often difficult for this era’s non-evolutionists to find and determine exactly. But things like 
SPECIESLy 
SPECIESD 
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shared characters and reproductive continuity were practically involved in species determination 
all the time – witness Lyell’s examples of hybrid sterility and limits to domestication. 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
I showed that the species concepts of various naturalists can be quite different in content while 
sharing a term and a referent. The observation of these fundamentally different concepts while 
maintaining consistent use of a term and consistent reference to the same groups in nature leads 
to a representation of conceptual structure which allows for changes that do not alter reference. 
The structures I have proposed for these influential naturalists’ species concepts include non-
referential semantic structure – component concepts which do not contribute to the reference of 
SPECIES. The advantage of describing concepts in this way allows detailed analysis of the change 
in such concepts over time – the addition and removal of component concepts, and the revision 
of the principles that form the relationships between them. 
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
I have first raised the question of how Darwin could be a species realist, when he rejects the 
properties which, to his peers, mark a real species in nature. I showed that he can hold this 
position by substantially revising what it means for a species to be real. I then asked why Darwin 
might be motivated to hold such a stance, when it was possible for him to instead take an anti-
realist stance about species. I offered one motivation – while Darwin’s origin account for species 
is different than those of his contemporaries, namely Charles Lyell, species realism is 
nevertheless dependent upon the origin account, though the dependence is importantly different. 
Lastly, I took a broader perspective on the species concept and detailed the mechanism of 
conceptual change occurring at Darwin’s publication of The Origin. I showed that naturalists at 
this time held different species concepts – that is, their species concepts differed in content and 
structure – though they used the same term to name the same referent. I claimed that Darwin 
could make such significant changes to the content of SPECIES without altering its structure 
because the changes were made to component concepts which did not originally contribute to the 
determination of SPECIES reference. Overall, I have given an analysis of the instance, motivation, 
and structure of conceptual change in SPECIES and SPECIES REALISM that Darwin initiates when 
he proposes his theory of evolution by natural selection and provided a philosophical framework 
for this particular conceptual shift that may be useful in other cases, including analysis of the 
contemporary species debate. 
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